Bazuka Android malware combines screen overlays, ADB and LLM controls

ThreatFabric has disclosed Bazuka, a previously unknown Android malware framework discovered in late October 2026 while the Dutch mobile security company was investigating an NFC-relay banking Trojan. The framework comprises a dropper or downloader, a core component and 23 modules covering phishing overlays, keylogging, two-factor authentication interception, remote control and cryptocurrency-address substitution.
A defining feature is an overlay technique that takes a screenshot of an Android device’s home or lock screen and can display it on demand. That image can conceal malicious activity occurring in the background. ThreatFabric also found large language model integration in Bazuka’s operator panel, supporting both locally hosted models and models reached through an API.
Modular delivery and device control
ThreatFabric observed two Bazuka attack-chain variants. One uses a dropper that asks for permission to install applications from third-party sources before downloading a standalone APK stager, while another downloader retrieves the main payload directly. One dropper impersonates a premium adult-friendly TikTok version using the package name com.tiktok.premium.
The stager or downloader retrieves the core and modules needed for a campaign. The core maintains command-and-control communication, loads DEX modules, dispatches commands, gathers device information and manages permissions and component updates. Bazuka uses two WebSocket channels: one for control commands and another for data exfiltration and screen-capture streams.
Once installed, the malware can monitor entered text and show a phishing overlay at selected moments. Its modules include tools for collecting contacts, accessing files, recording input, locating a device, capturing camera and microphone data, intercepting SMS messages and verification codes, forwarding calls through USSD commands, and replacing copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
Accessibility and wireless debugging risks
Bazuka abuses Android accessibility services and Android Debug Bridge shell commands to obtain permissions and automate actions. ThreatFabric said its core can open system settings, enable Developer options and turn on Wireless Debugging. It can intercept the pairing PIN and use it to establish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon.
The framework can also use accessibility APIs to disable the protection component used by Google Play, and it contains a self-destruct function that clears local storage, deletes its database and disables the application. ThreatFabric has not attributed Bazuka to a known actor, although the panel contains a mix of English and Russian interface elements.
What organizations should take from the finding
The operator panel can create accounts for traffers and build droppers with selectable Android manifest permissions. ThreatFabric said this points to distribution through social-media advertising or fraudulent sites, as well as possible Google Play distribution. The panel’s LLM prompts indicate that operators may use AI to score victims and decide which infections are most attractive.
For businesses, the finding makes unsolicited installation flows, accessibility requests and Wireless Debugging activation important signals for mobile security processes. Employees should use approved application channels and report unexpected permission prompts or screen behaviour so security teams can investigate devices before credential, verification-code or financial data is exposed.

