BO Team Breaches VMware vCenter and Targets Code-Signing Server

Kaspersky’s ICS CERT investigated a months-long intrusion at an unnamed Russian software developer in which BO Team compromised a VMware vCenter 7.0.3 server vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228, widely known as Log4Shell. The attackers obtained a root-level remote command line, accessed the hypervisor over SSH and later reached a server used to sign compiled commercial software builds.
The affected company develops software for customers in the Russian Federation. Kaspersky said the compromise extended across Windows and Linux servers, workstations, hypervisors, backup servers, security-management servers and network equipment. The incident was reported to the company’s specialists in June 2025.
From exposed access to hypervisor control
BO Team, also tracked as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy, first compromised a Linux terminal server through an exposed SSH service. It used that foothold to survey internal services including SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM and LDAP.
After unsuccessful attempts to sign in to the vCenter web interface from the terminal server, the group successfully exploited the vulnerable vCenter system. On the hypervisor, it placed a shell script called pgcache in /etc/cron.hourly/, causing it to run every hour. The script downloaded a second-stage script and the Global Socket, or GSocket, utility for remote control.
Kaspersky said the attackers used the nofrillsdns.com service to control activation through DNS records. When their command-and-control server was inactive, the associated record was set to 127.0.0.1; changing that record could trigger the installed script to retrieve and execute malware.
Development and signing systems were at risk
From the compromised virtualization environment, the attackers collected information on virtual machines and firewall rules, accessed guest systems and searched for secrets. Those actions led to the GitLab virtual machine, source-code repositories and the server’s private key. The private key was then used to connect to the organization’s Ansible orchestration system.
The group also used credentials and legitimate utilities to move through the Windows estate. Kaspersky described attempts to obtain credentials from LSASS memory, dump registry data and decrypt the Active Directory database. Reused passwords for system-administrator accounts in different domains ultimately enabled compromise of the Windows infrastructure.
A Windows server that signed the company’s compiled builds appeared to be of particular interest. Kaspersky assessed that access to such a system could support malicious code injection immediately before signing, or theft of a digital signature for signing malware. It said the development and code-signing compromise indicated that the operation could have developed into a supply-chain attack.
Detection interrupted the operation
The actors used timestomping, obfuscation, log deletion and living-off-the-land techniques, including RDP, SSH, SCP and native system tools, to reduce detection. After security controls detected and blocked activity, the attackers lost access and launched a phishing campaign in late July. The campaign was detected and prevented, although its messages bypassed SPF and DKIM checks after the attackers had obtained a private key from the mail server.
Kaspersky concluded that rapid response measures apparently stopped BO Team before it could complete the suspected supply-chain objective. For businesses, the case underscores the need to patch internet-facing virtualization platforms, separate CI/CD and signing systems, eliminate shared administrator passwords and monitor trusted administrative tools for unusual lateral movement.

