GitDoor and GraphDoor abuse GitHub and SharePoint for C2

Kaspersky has uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, a cyber-espionage campaign targeting government sectors in Asia and Africa. The activity uses two previously undocumented modular backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor, which conceal command-and-control traffic within legitimate cloud services including GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint and Ably.
Kaspersky identified the campaign in early 2026. One attack chain targeted an unspecified organization in Taiwan and began with MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate remote-access utility. The researchers said the method used to install the tool is unknown, although evidence indicates reuse of an infection that was already present in the network.
Remote-management tooling begins the delivery chain
The MeshCentral Agent was configured to connect to a hard-coded command-and-control server and retrieve three payload types staged on the endpoint: a legitimate executable for DLL sideloading, a malicious loader DLL, and an encrypted core payload. Kaspersky observed legitimate binaries including start.exe, pythonw.exe and zoomit.exe in this role.
Two loader types decode and launch the encrypted backdoor in the current process memory. One combines RC4 with an XOR mask, while the other uses XOR alone. The backdoors also use techniques such as control-flow flattening and nested helper functions, making analysis and tracing of execution flow more difficult.
Cloud platforms become command channels
GitDoor uses separate GitHub repositories to obtain command payloads and upload execution results. Kaspersky said the Havo repository is public and the Trix repository is private; their creation dates indicate campaign preparation may have started by the end of 2024. GitDoor supports 26 commands, covering file operations, keylogging, proxy functions, shellcode loading and termination of the implant.
Its downloadable modules can inject into processes, inspect services, alter firewall rules, manage scheduled tasks and registry values, capture screenshots, dump browser cookies and extract credentials from Windows LSASS using Mimikatz. They can also create or modify Windows accounts, retrieve WhatsApp database decryption keys and trigger NTLM authentication to an attacker-controlled destination.
GraphDoor creates an Intel_Log directory in the system Application Data folder, opens a named pipe and collects system details. It authenticates to a malicious application through login.microsoftonline.com on port 443, then uses an access token with the Microsoft Graph API to stage data on a SharePoint drive. It retrieves commands from the SharePoint site and can run plugins for screenshots, process listing and keystroke logging.
Detection needs cloud and endpoint context
Both implants can obtain additional plugins on demand and execute shellcode in memory. Modified Erfrp and Ably-based plugins proxy traffic, while GraphDoor includes a covert SOCKS5 proxy that tunnels TCP traffic through Ably's Pusher-compatible WebSocket service. This design lets operators extend functionality without changing host files.
Kaspersky found tactical overlap with activity tracked as Bronze Sandcastle and similarities to FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, also known as BlackTech. Shared staging directories and deployments within a day of GitDoor were observed on several victim systems, but Kaspersky said this does not establish a direct link or identify the actor.
For security teams, the practical implication is to investigate cloud API activity together with endpoint telemetry: expected GitHub, SharePoint and messaging traffic may require scrutiny when it coincides with DLL sideloading, unusual remote-management agents, credential access, proxy creation or in-memory code execution.

