Hijacked GitHub Accounts Used to Steal CI and Cloud Credentials

Attackers used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to plant a CI secret stealer in at least 1,806 repositories, Aikido Security reported. The activity began on Tuesday and used pull requests titled docs: dependency audit notes, usually opened from a wfx-docs branch, to test whether a compromised account could write to a target repository.
Aikido counted 61,764 repositories that received those test pull requests. SafeDep, examining default branches of public repositories, separately found 8,093 repositories that received malicious commits between 12:46 UTC on Tuesday and 04:36 UTC today. That broader figure includes repositories where the stealer may not have run, and both firms caution that public-repository visibility leaves the real scope unknown.
Workflows were the main delivery route
In 7,309 repositories in SafeDep's set, the attacker added the stealer to an existing CI workflow. Another 771 received it through an npm postinstall hook, which can execute on a developer workstation during npm install. Changes were commonly reverted within minutes, and execution logs or entire workflow runs were often deleted.
The absence of visible artefacts does not establish that a repository was safe. Aikido said a missing run number on the attacker's commit is a more reliable indicator that the stealer ran. Other indicators include short-lived chore/[a-z0-9]{8} or ci-check-[0-9]{4} branches, the commit messages ci: refresh build cache and chore: add ci helper, and the SHA-256 value 89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cf.
Secrets, cloud identities and runner data were targeted
The code was designed to collect GitHub Actions secrets and variables, the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and Actions runtime tokens, AI-service keys, and secrets resident in runner processes. It also sought credential files for AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI and SSH, alongside repository data, recent commits and workflow artefacts.
On self-hosted runners, the stealer also targeted cloud instance metadata, Docker state and systemd units. SafeDep found exfiltration by HTTP POST to identified servers or to a Telegram chat. In a sample of 200 payload commits, about one fifth used Telegram only.
Rotation alone may not remove persistence
The malware could exchange GitHub OIDC tokens for AWS, GCP and Azure sessions. On AWS, it could create long-lived IAM user access keys or alter a role trust policy; on Azure, it could add federated identity credentials prefixed wfx-ci- to Entra ID applications. Those changes could permit future authentication without a stored secret, including after token rotation.
Affected teams should revoke the commit author's tokens, OAuth grants, SSH keys and sessions, enable 2FA, and rotate every secret and variable accessible to the repository. They should also review CloudTrail, Entra ID federated credentials, GCP workload-identity activity and Vault JWT logins. Anyone who ran npm install on an affected commit should treat the machine as compromised and rotate its keys; the practical implication is that repository cleanup must be paired with identity, cloud and endpoint investigation.

