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Qubole Trusted AWS Access Abused to Reach Customer Accounts

Qubole Trusted AWS Access Abused to Reach Customer Accounts

Attackers accessed AWS accounts belonging to multiple Qubole customers between October 14 and October 26, using credentials for the AWS account that Qubole’s platform uses to reach customer environments. Wiz said the activity resulted in theft of stored secrets and data. Qubole is a data lake platform owned by Idera.

The campaign abused IAM roles created by customers to allow Qubole access. Those roles trusted Qubole’s AWS account, 805246085872, to perform AssumeRole requests. The researchers said the attacker’s requests were accepted because they came from that trusted account and included a matching External ID.

Trusted roles became the access path

An External ID is required in this configuration, but AWS does not treat it as a secret. AWS guidance notes that users able to view the role can see the value. Wiz found that most roles used in the attack were no longer active, yet they still trusted Qubole’s account and could therefore be assumed by an actor holding the relevant credentials.

Sentra identified the activity in several customer environments and alerted Wiz. In the environments examined, the attacker searched for credentials by reading Lambda environment variables, retrieving secrets from AWS Secrets Manager and accessing values in AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store. The attacker then used TruffleHog to test the credentials that had been found.

The exposed material included customers’ AWS access keys, Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials. The actor also copied S3 data, retrieving data from any bucket available to an assumed role rather than selecting particular files. In some cases, an entire bucket was downloaded during one session.

What AWS teams should investigate

Organizations that have connected Qubole to AWS, including those that no longer use the service, should review CloudTrail from October 1 onward in every account containing a Qubole role. Wiz highlighted AssumeRole activity from account 805246085872 where the source address is outside AWS. It also identified the IAM principal ID AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS as activity requiring investigation.

Additional indicators include sessions beginning with quiam-, the TruffleHog user agent on GetCallerIdentity requests, and activity from specified OVH-hosted or Mullvad VPN addresses. A VPN address match alone is not proof because other users may share those addresses. Wiz also noted that Qubole’s regular traffic was observed from AWS addresses.

Containment requires more than credential rotation

For suspicious role sessions, responders should examine follow-on access to Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, Lambda and S3. CloudTrail management events record AssumeRole requests and bucket listings, but not the S3 objects read. Determining object-level access requires S3 data events or S3 server access logs; several affected victims lacked those records.

Wiz recommends revoking active role sessions and rotating every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable reachable by an abused role. Rotation alone does not terminate sessions that have already been issued. Organizations should remove unused Qubole roles or remove Qubole’s account from their trust policies, replace an account-wide root principal with the documented specific IAM principal where supported, and review the permissions assigned to vendor roles.

The researchers said an aws:SourceIp condition alone would have blocked every observed role assumption, while an aws:SourceVpce condition can further limit the path. Teams should treat External IDs as visible values rather than a sole security control, use distinct values per role where possible, alert on vendor-account assumptions from unexpected networks, and enable organization-wide logging plus S3 data events for sensitive buckets. The practical business implication is that dormant third-party IAM trust relationships need the same continuous review, scope reduction and incident logging as active production access.

#cloudsecurity#awssecurity#identitysecurity#databreach
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min read 4 09.11.2026
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Qubole Trusted AWS Access Abused to Reach Customer Accounts

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