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SCKit Targets ScreenConnect Sessions and MSP Technician Workstations

SCKit Targets ScreenConnect Sessions and MSP Technician Workstations

Blackpoint Cyber has identified an attacker toolkit known as SCKit that can turn ConnectWise ScreenConnect support activity into a route toward managed service provider environments. The toolkit exploits CVE-2026-84869, a now-patched critical ScreenConnect flaw with a CVSS score of 9.9, while also seeking to abuse authenticated operator sessions and legitimate management functions.

Blackpoint Cyber’s Adversary Pursuit Group said its testing of a fully patched ScreenConnect client successfully prevented execution of the exploit payload. That finding indicates that the observed exploit targets the known vulnerability rather than a newly discovered flaw. However, patching does not remove the risk posed when an attacker obtains a valid operator session.

From a managed endpoint to a technician workstation

SCKit includes a component called RelayTrap, designed to reverse-pivot from a managed endpoint to the workstation of a technician who connects to investigate suspicious activity. The toolkit can use ScreenConnect’s built-in Run Command capability, first checking for ScreenConnect and then downloading an attacker-controlled MSI file named sc.msi. That installer delivers the sckit-run.bat batch-script dropper.

The dropper contacts ns.mo7sen[.]dev for a PowerShell decoder called sckit-decoder.ps1 and deploys further toolkit components. These include SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1, which establishes persistent access through two unauthorized ScreenConnect Access clients, as well as scripts and C# code that interfere with existing ScreenConnect Guest sessions.

RelayTrap attempts a guest-to-host file-execution technique associated with CVE-2026-84869 by replacing the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest and sending the payload toward the connecting technician. If it succeeds, the malware attempts to recover authenticated ScreenConnect browser sessions and use the technician’s existing permissions to issue commands to further endpoints. Blackpoint Cyber said commands executed through existing ScreenConnect agents could deploy additional software as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, without a separate execution mechanism on every machine.

Session theft expands the risk beyond a single customer

After reaching a technician workstation, SCKit searches browser data and process memory for authenticated management sessions, including .ASPXAUTH cookies. The aim is to propagate to systems accessible through that technician’s management role without acquiring credentials. This is especially consequential for MSPs because technicians commonly administer endpoints belonging to multiple customers from workstations that also hold privileged tools and active sessions.

There is no evidence that SCKit has successfully propagated to a technician workstation or bypassed the vendor patch for CVE-2026-84869. Blackpoint Cyber also said that, while the toolkit can exploit the flaw, available evidence does not establish an unpatched ScreenConnect client as the initial entry point. The company said malicious ScreenConnect extensions appear linked to initial access, but further forensic evidence is needed to confirm that assessment.

Extensions receive additional scrutiny

ConnectWise said it was investigating reports affecting a limited number of ScreenConnect partners and disabled five third-party extensions where it could take action. The company advised on-premises partners to disable the identified extensions immediately, while noting that their presence alone does not prove compromise.

Huntress reported a serious authentication flaw in RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, one of the extensions blocked by ConnectWise. When an administrator had not configured an access key, the extension accepted a blank value, potentially allowing unauthorized commands without ScreenConnect’s normal authentication controls. RMM+ operates independently of ScreenConnect user accounts, roles and authentication, and Huntress observed commands reaching endpoints across several ScreenConnect instances within minutes with no corresponding login activity.

Business implication

MSPs should apply the ScreenConnect fix, disable affected extensions where appropriate, and investigate the management relationship rather than only the initially affected endpoint. Reviews should include rogue Access installations, administrative command history, technician workstations and browser sessions, particularly after support personnel have connected to a suspected system.

#cybersecurity#screenconnect#mspsecurity#sessionsecurity
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min read 5 12.11.2026
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SCKit Targets ScreenConnect Sessions and MSP Technician Workstations

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