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Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Deployed to 288 Endpoints

Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Deployed to 288 Endpoints

Attackers used cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to deploy rogue ScreenConnect clients to at least 288 managed endpoints across 48 organizations, Huntress reported. The activity was first detected on November 11, 2026, at about 5:47 p.m. UTC. ConnectWise has disabled five third-party extensions in partner environments as a precaution while it investigates unauthorized access reports.

ConnectWise said it has found no evidence of a compromise of its infrastructure or a vulnerability in ScreenConnect. Its initial assessment is that attackers may have abused independent third-party extensions installed in partner environments, while the initial access method and the full scope remain under investigation.

Rogue clients create access beyond the original panel

Huntress said the attackers used the Run Command feature of compromised cloud-hosted panels to install a rogue ScreenClient on endpoints. That client establishes a persistent backdoor that does not depend on the panel used for the initial deployment.

The suspected lateral movement chain starts when a technician connects to an infected endpoint through ScreenConnect. Malware on the endpoint is designed to spread to the technician workstation, steal saved browser sessions and authentication tokens, and pivot to other ScreenConnect panels available to that technician. Huntress stressed that it has not observed a successful jump from an infected endpoint to a technician workstation, or from that workstation to other endpoints; some capabilities were reconstructed through payload analysis.

SCKit payloads and extension response

The rogue clients deliver SCKit, a custom toolkit that Huntress said provides persistent remote access and a relay trap for intercepting session cookies. A Base64-encoded dropper named sckit-run.bat retrieves the PowerShell payload sckit-decoder.ps1, which launches the toolkit. Other components are designed to add Microsoft Defender exclusions, install a second attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client, create a scheduled task called TrapWatch, and replace a legitimate ScreenConnect installation.

ConnectWise identified about 400 partner environments with at least one affected third-party extension installed. It said the presence of an extension does not establish compromise. The extensions expose an API capable of remote command execution, but API access is protected by a passphrase configured by the partner. The extensions disabled as a precaution are Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link.

Checks for managed service providers

ConnectWise has urged on-premises partners to disable the extensions and advised all partners to ensure security controls are running and preserve suspicious-activity logs. It highlighted unusual sign-ins, unfamiliar locations, repeated login failures, unexpected MFA prompts, new administrator accounts, permission changes, unexpected extension installations, remote commands, Toolbox activity, and unapproved remote-access software as indicators requiring review.

Huntress advises ScreenConnect users to check Run Command history even when no alert has been received. Sophos also observed unauthorized client deployments tied to the same operating pattern, including commands that downloaded ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi and installed it silently. For businesses, the immediate implication is to review panel activity and endpoint deployments, preserve evidence, investigate the published indicators, and invalidate suspicious technician sessions before they can be reused to reach additional panels or devices.

#cybersecurity#screenconnect#endpointsecurity#remotemanagement
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min read 4 12.11.2026
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Rogue ScreenConnect Clients Deployed to 288 Endpoints

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