Oligo Connects TeamPCP to Redis Campaigns Reaching Back to 2020
Oligo Security has linked the threat actor known as TeamPCP to attacks on exposed Redis servers dating back to 2020, indicating that the group or its associated operational ecosystem had targeted internet-facing infrastructure years before its later software supply-chain campaigns. The analysis connects activity across Redis, Ray, Docker and React, including the ShadowRay 2.0 campaign in the second half of 2025 and TA-NATALSTATUS, which delivered cryptocurrency miners to exposed Redis servers.
Researchers Avi Lumelsky and Gal Elbaz said the connection rests on overlapping domains, malware deployment paths, staging techniques, backend infrastructure and operational tradecraft. Oligo described the evidence as a direct operational bridge between identities seen during ShadowRay 2.0 and the actor that later operated publicly as TeamPCP.
From exposed services to supply-chain compromise
TA-NATALSTATUS is assessed as an evolution of a Redis-targeting campaign documented by Trend Micro in April 2020. That history suggests sustained interest in accessible infrastructure rather than an actor that emerged only in late 2025.
TeamPCP first drew wider attention after being linked to the exploitation of flaws in React Server Components and Next.js. That activity, known as Operation PCPcat, was used to extract credentials and sensitive data from compromised environments. Flare later described a large campaign against cloud-native environments designed to build distributed proxy and scanning infrastructure and support data theft, ransomware, extortion and cryptocurrency mining.
The group subsequently moved into high-profile supply-chain compromises, poisoning popular open-source libraries through GitHub Actions abuse and token theft. The pattern aligns with the wider mix of Linux, AI and supply-chain risks tracked in Linux, AI and supply-chain risks, where credential protection and infrastructure exposure remain central defensive concerns.
Automated propagation and a destructive Kubernetes branch
Oligo said TeamPCP repeatedly abused known flaws affecting React, Docker, Redis and Ray, relying on automated and wormable exploitation to spread. The later supply-chain activity extends that approach by using legitimate cloud infrastructure and established techniques to reach developer systems at scale.
Its malware toolkit has also changed. A Python script named kube.py, used after Kubernetes environments are breached, initially focused on propagation and persistence. Variants observed as recently as March 2026 added wiper-like capabilities.
When a victim system was configured for the Iran timezone, the script deployed a DaemonSet intended to wipe every node in a Kubernetes cluster using a wiper called Kamikaze. On Kubernetes nodes outside Iran, it deployed the CanisterWorm backdoor. On non-Kubernetes Iranian systems, it ran a poison_pill() routine to erase the full file system.
What organizations should take from the findings
Oligo cautioned that the available evidence cannot establish with complete certainty whether the continuity represents a direct rebrand, shared operators or close collaboration. It does show that TeamPCP is part of an existing operational ecosystem.
For businesses operating cloud-native systems, the practical implication is to reduce exposure around internet-facing Redis, Ray, Docker and React services; apply fixes for known vulnerabilities; protect GitHub Actions and other access tokens; and investigate unexpected Kubernetes DaemonSets or post-compromise scripts. These controls address the access paths and propagation mechanisms identified in the campaigns.