Turla’s Cereal toolset targets Exchange email traffic

Russia-aligned threat actor Turla, also known as Snake, has used a previously undocumented malware framework called Cereal to collect email from Microsoft Exchange servers. ESET observed the toolset at two government entities in Kazakhstan and Romania in late 2025. The framework is designed for long-term espionage, combining modular .NET components with access to an organisation’s mail flow.
The initial access method remains unknown. ESET noted that Turla has previously used spear-phishing, watering-hole attacks and ISP-level adversary-in-the-middle activity. Once access is established, however, Cereal is built to operate from the compromised Exchange environment rather than relying on a conventional external command-and-control server.
Exchange server used as an internal collection point
Cereal receives commands, executes them in memory, maps the infected network and harvests targeted messages. Its name reflects extensive use of serialization, the process of converting data structures or object state into a form that can be stored, transmitted and reconstructed.
ESET said the framework leaves little evidence on disk, hides within legitimate Exchange processes and avoids external infrastructure that defenders could discover or block. This makes the mail server both an internal execution hub and a collection point for sensitive correspondence.
The framework has eight identified components. CerealRunner deploys additional modules, including CerealLoader, CerealSprinter, CerealIron and CerealMoth. CerealLoader runs a .NET assembly from an encrypted file, while CerealSprinter decrypts and launches CerealNeuron, CerealHermit and CerealBox. CerealIron loads .NET assemblies from non-.NET processes, and CerealMoth runs a specified method from a supplied assembly.
Email harvesting and in-memory commands
CerealNeuron is a passive backdoor on an Exchange server that listens for web requests made to paths resembling routine Exchange traffic. CerealHermit is a related component that reads encrypted commands from disk and has no network capability of its own. The operators send separate compiled .NET programs, which CerealRunner unpacks and executes in memory before results are passed back to CerealNeuron for encrypted exfiltration.
The email-collection component, CerealBox, injects into the Exchange transport service, EdgeTransport.exe. It scans messages containing DOC, DOCX or PDF attachments and checks hard-coded lists of sender addresses, recipient addresses, subject lines and attachment names. Matching messages are compressed, encrypted and staged in files on disk before being exfiltrated and deleted through CerealNeuron commands.
In the Romanian government case, ESET found CerealBox configured to collect communications involving NATO and European Union institutional addresses. Available commands can retrieve mailboxes or individual messages, queue Active Directory queries for computers, users, groups and DNS records, run WMI queries, extract LSA Secrets, list volume snapshots and conduct file operations.
What defenders should examine
ESET researcher Matías Porolli said the volume of near-identical binaries compiled for specific tasks suggests an internal process for automating command compilation and packaging. The modular design points to a mature platform rather than an improvised set of scripts.
For organisations running Microsoft Exchange, the practical implication is to investigate changes around the transport pipeline and legitimate Exchange processes alongside network alerts. Monitoring should include unexpected in-memory .NET execution, Exchange-like web paths, encrypted files staged on servers, unusual mailbox collection and directory-discovery activity, because Cereal is designed to minimise the external signals that many controls prioritise.

